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Abstract— The Controller Area Network (CAN) is considered
as the de-facto standard for the in-vehicle communications due
to its real-time performance and high reliability. Unfortunately,
the lack of security protection on the CAN bus gives attackers
the opportunity to remotely compromise a vehicle. In this
paper, we propose a Lightweight Encryption and Authentication
Protocol (LEAP) with low cost and high efficiency to address
the security issue of the CAN bus. LEAP exploits the security-
enhanced stream cipher primitive to provide encryption and
authentication for the CAN messages. Compared with the
state-of-the-art Message Authentication Code (MAC) based
approaches, LEAP requires less memory, is 8X faster, and
thwarts the most recently proposed attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
Vehicle automation has been one of the fundamental
applications in the field of Intelligent Transportation Sys-
tems (ITSs) [1]. With the demanding requirements of in-
vehicle infotainment and driving safety, more and more
advanced information processing technologies have been
integrated into the modern vehicles. To support the functions
of communication and vehicle control, a modern vehicle
is a sophisticated and intelligent system with dozens of
Electronic Control Units (ECUs) running software in the size
of several hundred megabytes [2]. With numerous sensors,
actors, and processors being connected on the in-vehicle
networks, a vehicle can provide drivers and manufacturers
with a variety of services, including vehicle diagnostics,
Firmware Updating Over-the-Air (FOTA) [3], and automatic
driving, etc [4].
The Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol is the de-
facto standard for the in-vehicle networks due to the dramat-
ically decreased communication lines and the higher data
transmission reliability [5]. Fig. 1 is the typical in-vehicle
networks based on the CAN bus. The high-speed CAN bus
has about 500 Kbps data rate for the time-critical ECUs,
while the low-speed CAN bus is used for other ECUs that
have no real-time requirement. The original CAN protocol is
designed under the assumption that all ECUs are legitimate,
trustworthy, and operating according to their specifications
[2]. No security consideration results in intrinsic vulnerabili-
ties for the CAN protocol. Moreover, external interfaces such
as the Second On-Board Diagnostic (OBD-II), Bluetooth,
Wi-Fi, and the Global Positioning System (GPS) provide
opportunities for attackers to break into the unprotected CAN
Fig. 1. In-vehicle networks based on the CAN bus.
bus. Koscher et al. [6] demonstrated that it was possible
to control the entire automotive electronics system via the
available interfaces. In 2015, this threat became a reality
when Miller and Valasek [7] demonstrated how to remotely
control a Jeep Cherokee by compromising the vulnerable
ECUs, which triggered Chrysler to recall approximately 1.4
million vehicle.
B. Current Approaches
The current approaches to secure the CAN bus can be clas-
sified into two categories, i.e., the Intrusion Detection Sys-
tems (IDSs) and the authenticated CAN [8]. The anomaly-
based IDSs focus on the features of the CAN bus to detect the
known and unknown attacks [9]. The most essential issue to
be considered when designing an anomaly-based IDS is what
feature the detector exploits to discriminate between normal
and abnormal. Since there is no timestamp carried in the
CAN messages, Cho et al. [10] developed the Clock-based
IDS (CIDS) that fingerprints the sender ECUs according to
the estimated clock skews. Considering the nature that most
of the CAN messages on the CAN bus are cyclic and the
format of the data-field is fixed due to rigid signal allocation,
the low-dimensional features of the CAN messages could be
explored to detect the anomaly on the CAN bus [11]. The
downside is that no single IDS is able to detect all the attacks.
Without protecting the confidentiality and authentication of
the CAN messages, the sophisticated attackers can bypass a
specific type of IDS and compromise the in-vehicle networks
[12].
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The authenticated CAN suggests to attach a Message
Authentication Code (MAC) to each CAN message for
authentication. MAC protects a message’s authenticity and
allows the verifiers who also possess the secret key to
detect any changes in the message content. Woo et al. [13]
designed an MAC-based security protocol that inserted the
divided MAC in the extended identifier field and the Cyclic
Redundancy Check (CRC) field. However, the intensive com-
putation of MAC could degrade or even cripple an ECU’s
normal operation. The Denial of Service (DoS) attacks can
be easily launched on ECUs where the MAC-based security
is implemented [14].
C. Contributions
There are three major challenges to design a practical
security scheme for CAN. First, the confidentiality and
authentication are essential for each CAN message to resist
the known and unknown attacks. Second, the resource of
most life-critical ECUs is limited to support the simple
function. The security scheme should guarantee the real-
time performance of the CAN bus. Third, because a vehicle
has a life cycle of more than five years, the compatibility
of the in-vehicle networks should be considered. Physical
modification of the in-vehicle architecture or replacement of
a large number of ECUs are not acceptable.
In this paper, we present the basic attack models based
on the thorough analysis of the recently proposed attack
cases. Then we propose a Lightweight Encryption and
Authentication Protocol (LEAP) to provide the in-vehicle
networks with security, efficiency, and compatibility. The
major contributions of our work are as follows:
• LEAP exploits the stream cipher RC4 instead of MAC
to encrypt and authenticate each CAN message, which
is lightweight in terms of time consumption and storage
overhead. Thus, the efficiency and real-time perfor-
mance of the CAN bus can be guaranteed. Moreover,
LEAP only modifies the software of ECUs so that it is
compatible with the existing in-vehicle networks.
• Considering that RC4 is not as secure as the classical
cryptographic algorithms, we design a key management
mechanism with low cost and high efficiency to enhance
the security of LEAP. The session keys will be updated
and distributed to ECUs periodically to resist the brute-
force attack. This process will be performed when the
vehicle is at idle speed to eliminate the impact on the
CAN bus communications.
• A set of experiments has been conducted on the same
platform as [10]. We launch the basic attack models
to demonstrate the security of LEAP. The results show
that LEAP consumes less memory and is of 8X higher
efficiency than the MAC-based approaches.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II gives a brief description of CAN and analyzes
the attack models systematically. The proposed LEAP is
elaborated in Section III. Section IV discusses how the
proposed approach can thwart different attacks. Performance
Fig. 2. Format of the CAN message and the bus arbitration.
evaluation is reported in Section V before we conclude in
Section VI.
II. ATTACK MODELS
CAN messages are sent by ECUs in compliance with the
format as shown in Fig. 2. In addition to the Data Field, each
message carries necessary information for the bus arbitration
and the error management. A CAN message contains a
unique Identifier (ID) representing its source and priority
without other information about the sender or the receiver.
Fig. 2 illustrates a situation that three ECUs compete to
get access to the shared bus. The Data Length Code (DLC)
contains the length of the Data Field which is in the range
of 0 to 64 bits. This message format and the underlying
CAN protocol have four major security vulnerabilities [6]:
the broadcast nature makes the messages available to all
ECUs on the CAN bus; it will be vulnerable to DoS attacks
due to the simple arbitration mechanism; no authentication
field to identify the sender and the receiver of each message;
and the access control is non-existing or very weak.
According to the attackers’ capabilities, they can be con-
sidered as either strong attackers or weak attackers [15].
Strong attackers are those who can fully compromise an ECU
and gain control of its software and memory. It means that
a strong attacker is able to access any critical data stored
in the memory. Thus, a strong attacker not only can inject
messages with arbitrary IDs and contents on the CAN bus,
but also can disable the security mechanisms built in ECUs.
Weak attackers are those who cannot access critical data
in the compromised ECUs. Therefore, a weak attacker can
only stop the weakly compromised ECU or eavesdrop on the
CAN bus. In this paper, we focus on the existing attack cases
that have been implemented to severely impair the in-vehicle
security [7], [13], [15]. These attacks are composed of the
following four basic attack models:
• Eavesdrop Attack. As shown in Fig. 3(a), the first step
of the attacks is to eavesdrop on the CAN bus to figure
out the exact format and content to control the target
ECU. The lack of confidentiality for the CAN messages
makes it very easy for a weak attacker ECU-A to launch
the eavesdrop attack.
Fig. 3. The basic attack models. (a) Eavesdrop Attack. (b) Replay Attack. (c) Masquerade Attack. (d) Flooding Attack.
• Replay Attack. As shown in Fig. 3(b), a strong attacker
ECU-A sends a message received from the CAN bus
without modifying it. Due to the lack of authentication
on the CAN bus, the receiver ECU-B will function
abnormally under the replayed control information.
• Masquerade Attack. Having known the content and
frequency of the messages from ECU-B, the strong
attack could launch the masquerade attack in Fig. 3(c).
The attacker first suspends the message transmission
of ECU-B, then uses the fully compromised ECU-A
sends messages using ECU-B’s ID to manipulate other
legitimate ECUs.
• Flooding Attack. As shown in Fig. 3(d), the flooding
attack is a kind of DoS attack, whose objective is to
exhaust the target ECU’s computational resources by
sending it large amounts of messages.
III. LIGHTWEIGHT ENCRYPTION AND AUTHENTICATION
PROTOCOL
LEAP consists of two mechanisms, i.e., the key man-
agement mechanism, and the message encryption and au-
thentication mechanism. In the key management mechanism,
a Secure ECU is responsible to generate the session keys
periodically and distribute them to each pair of commu-
nicating ECUs. In the message encryption and authenti-
cation mechanism, each pair of communicating ECUs use
the shared session key to guarantee the confidentiality and
authentication of the CAN messages. The notations and
definitions are listed in Table I.
A. Key Management Mechanism
The key management mechanism is of top priority to
meet all the security requirements. As shown in Fig. 4, the
TABLE I
NOTATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
Notations Definitions
IDi ID of ECUi
CTRij Massage counter between ECUi and ECUj
LKi Long-term symmetric key of ECUi
SKnij n-th session key of ECUi and ECUj
PM Plaintext of the CAN message
CM Ciphertext of the CAN message
K Key stream generated by RC4 using SK
KDFkey() Keyed one-way function for key derivation
Hkey() Keyed hash function to generate MAC
Ekey() Symmetric encryption algorithm
Dkey() Symmetric decryption algorithm
long-term symmetric keys LKi are generated in the vehicle
manufacturing stage or when an ECU is replaced. The ses-
sion keys SKnij are derived from LKi and LKj periodically
for the message encryption and authentication mechanism.
The sets of session keys are different because each ECU
communicates with specific ECUs. For example, ECU0 only
communicates with ECU1 and ECU3. The security of the
session keys is enhanced with two methods. First, SKnij
are only shared between ECUi and ECUj . Thus, a fully
compromised ECU cannot deceive ECUs that do not directly
communicate with it. Second, SKnij are updated periodically
to resist the brute-force attack.
All the long-term symmetric keys are stored in the Secure
ECU, which has sufficient resource and high security level
and acts as the centralized manager to secure the key
Fig. 4. Key management mechanism.
management mechanism. We optimize the key update and
distribution process proposed in [13] to achieve same security
with higher efficiency. The Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) is used as the symmetric cryptographic algorithms
(Ekey and Dkey). The Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) is used
as the keyed hash function (Hkey). ECUi and ECUj are a
pair of communicating ECUs, Fig. 5 illustrates the six steps
to update and distribute the shared session key to them.
Step 1. The Secure ECU selects a random value as Seednij ,
then generates the symmetric session key SKnij using the
long-term symmetric key LKi and LKj .
Step 2. The Secure ECU encrypts SKnij using LKi and
LKj respectively to generate Cipheri and Cipherj .
Step 3. The Secure ECU generates MAC-1i of the con-
catenation of IDi and Cipheri using LKi. A key-update
request containing IDi, MAC-1i and Cipheri is broadcasted
for ECUi. The same process applies to ECUj .
Step 4. ECUi verifies MAC-1i to authenticate the key-
update request. Then ECUi gets SKnij by decrypting Cipheri
using LKi. The same process applies to ECUj .
Step 5. ECUi generates MAC-2i of IDi using SKnij
and sends the key-update response to the Secure ECU for
authentication. The same process applies to ECUj .
Step 6. The Secure ECU verifies MAC-2i and MAC-2j to
authenticate the key-update response from ECUi and ECUj .
We assume the security of AES and SHA, as well as the
long-term symmetric keys. [13] gives the strict security proof
of the key update and distribution process. Therefore, SKnij
can be securely transmitted from the Secure ECU to ECUi
and ECUj .
B. Message Encryption and Authentication Mechanism
RC4 is one of the most widely-used stream cipher algo-
rithms that consists of the Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA)
and the Pseudo-Random Generation Algorithm (PRGA) [16].
KSA generates the initial permutation from a key with
m bytes. Typically, m is in the range of 5 to 64. The
main part of RC4 is PRGA that produces one-byte output in
each step. The encryption is an XOR of the pseudo-random
sequence with the plaintext.
After the key update and distribution process, each pair
of communicating ECUs will have a symmetric session
Fig. 5. Session key update and distribution process.
key to perform the message encryption and authentication
process based on RC4 instead of the AES and MAC-
based approaches. The sender ECUi and the receiver ECUj
are a pair of communicating ECUs, the proposed message
encryption and authentication approach is illustrated in Fig.
6. There are four steps for ECUi before broadcasting a CAN
message:
Step 1. ECUi performs RC4 to generate the key stream
K = {k0, k1, k2, ..., k255} using SKnij .
Step 2. ECUi performs an XOR operation between
ECUi’s IDi and (k0||k24)[0 : 10] to generate ID′i.
Step 3. ECUi determines the location to insert ID′i in the
Data Field according to k48. Since ID′i has 11 bits and the
Data Field has 64 bits, there are 54 possible locations for
ID′i. We set PM[l](l = k24 mod 54) as the location of ID
′
i[0].
Step 4. ECUi performs an XOR operation between PM
and (k72||k96...||k240) to generate CM. Finally, ECUi broad-
casts the CAN message with CM in the Data Field.
Since the proposed approach will generate distinct key
Fig. 6. RC4 based encryption and authentication for the CAN message.
stream K for each CAN message, the sender ECUi and the
receiver ECUj jointly manage a message counter CTRij for
synchronization. The 5-bit CTRij is stored in the pair of
communicating ECUs and will be reset in the key update
and distribution process. CTRij will add 1 if the sender ECUi
broadcasts a CAN message or the receiver ECUj successfully
receives a CAN message. When receiving a CAN message,
the receiver ECUj first generates the key stream K using
the shared symmetric session key SKnij according to CTRij .
Then the receiver ECUj decrypts CM using the key stream
K to get PM and IDi. The receiver compares IDi out of
CM with ID of the received message. If they are same,
it is verified that this CAN message is from ECUi. If the
authentication fails, this message will be discarded by ECUj
and CTRij will remain unchanged.
LEAP acts as the last line of defense to protect the
confidentiality and authentication of the CAN messages. It
prevents a compromised ECU from eavesdropping on the
CAN bus or using other ECUs’ IDs to broadcast messages.
The only imperfection of our design is that a fully com-
promised ECUi can still deceive ECUj by sending fake
messages using the shared symmetric session key SKnij .
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we first provide the experiment settings.
Then, we measure the cost of the brute-force attack on RC4
to explain how to guarantee the security of the session keys.
Finally, we launch the basic attack models and analyze the
security of LEAP theoretically and experimentally.
A. Experiment Settings
As shown in Fig. 7, we configure a CAN bus prototype
similar to [10], in which there are three ECUs connecting to
each other via a 2-wire bus. ECU1 (ID1 0x0001) and ECU2
(ID2 0x0002) is a pair of communicating ECUs. ECU3 acts
as the Secure ECU (IDS 0x0000) or a fully compromised
ECUA (IDA 0x0003). Each ECU consists of a Seeeduino
v4.2 board and a SeeedStudio CAN bus shield v2.0. Seee-
duino board is equipped with an ATmega328 microcontroller
containing 16 MHz clock, 32 KB flash, 2 KB RAM,
and 1 KB EEPRAM. CAN bus shield adopts MCP2515
CAN bus controller with SPI interface and MCP2551 CAN
transceiver to give Seeeduino CAN bus communication ca-
pability.
Fig. 7. CAN bus prototype.
TABLE II
COST OF BRUTE-FORCE ATTACK ON RC4
Time for each
key search / µs
Average attack time / hour
for different key lengths
40 bits 64 bits 128 bits
Laptop 30 4, 581 7.7× 1010 1.4× 1030
FPGA 0.1 15 2.5× 108 4.7× 1027
B. Security of RC4
The security of LEAP is based on two prerequisites. First,
the key update and distribution process is secure. Second,
the session key SKnij for RC4 cannot be cracked in one
update cycle. Since SKnij is generated by the Secure ECU
and is encrypted using AES, the confidentiality of SKnij are
guaranteed. The 32-bit truncated MAC is used to authenticate
SKnij with the secure long-term symmetric keys. Thus, SKnij
is secure from the Secure ECU to ECUi and ECUj [13].
Although RC4 has been broken in the transport layer secu-
rity protocol [17], it is still sufficiently secure to be deployed
in the CAN bus as long as its key-space is large enough
against the brute-force attack. As explained in Section II,
a compromised ECUA is able to passively eavesdrop on
the CAN bus. Considering the worst case, the compromised
ECUA knows the plaintext from the target ECU. Thus, it
is a kind of known-plaintext attack. The attacker chooses
a candidate key SK from the key-space K to operate the
decryption then verifies the correctness of SK by comparing
with the plaintext. If the key of RC4 is n-bit, the scale of K
is 2n and it will take on an average of 2n−1 iterations to get
the correct key. Therefore, the time complexity of the brute-
force attack on RC4 is O(2n). We run the brute-force attack
on both a laptop with 2.5 GHz CPU and 8.00 GB RAM and
a FPGA with 100 MHz clock. The cost of the brute-force
attack on RC4 with different key length is listed in Table
II. For example, for a 40-bit key, it takes 4, 581 hours for
laptop or 15 hours for FPGA to crack RC4. Even though
GPU can be used to accelerate the brute-force attack [18],
the results show that the 128-bit session key is secure enough
for RC4.
C. Security of LEAP
We first theoretically prove the security of LEAP.
Then, ECUA act as the attacker to experimentally
test the resistance of LEAP against each basic attack
model. For simplicity, the 128-bit session key is set as
{0x00, 0x01, ..., 0x0f}, the content of a CAN message is set
as {0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f} (two bytes are left
to insert ID′). The data flow of the four basic attack models
is shown in Fig. 8. The security of LEAP is guaranteed by
the following lemmas:
Lemma 1. LEAP is secure against the eavesdrop attack.
Proof. In LEAP, the 64-bit payload is encrypted using the
key-stream generated by RC4. Vanhoef et al. [17] present an
efficient plaintext recovery attack on RC4 that can decrypt
a secure cookie with a success rate of 94% using 9 × 227
ciphertexts in 75 hours. Since the most frequency of the
Fig. 8. Data flow of basic attack models.
CAN messages is about 200 Hz, an ECU can send 200 ×
3, 600× 24 = 17, 280, 000 messages in 24 hours, which is
much less than 9× 227. Thus, LEAP is resistant against the
eavesdrop attack.
In the experiment, ECU1 broadcasts 10 CAN messages
per second and ECUA gets all messages from ECU1. In this
case, the encrypted CAN messages with same content are
{0x556ecf97d32e7c6a, 0xb1df00bff164ecd1, 0xb2cd8430
0be83bea, 0xac8f35751325a6dd, 0x9823d8520d0f9235...}.
It is difficult for the attacker to recover the plaintext and the
session key from the ciphertexts in 24 hours.
Lemma 2. LEAP is secure against the replay attack.
Proof. A counter is kept for each pair of communicating
ECUs for synchronization. The sender will generate distinct
key-stream for each message according to the counter. There-
fore, the replay attack cannot be successfully launched as
long as the session key is secure.
ECU1 broadcasts 10 CAN messages per second,
ECUA replays all messages received from ECU1 for
10, 000 times, and ECU2 receives messages from
ECU1 and ECUA. For example, ECU2 decrypts the
first 10 replayed messages from ECUA to get the IDs =
{0x1cf3, 0x23c1, 0x9e1e, 0xee5e, 0x8c36, 0x521b, 0x6682,
0xa194, 0x3cbe, 0x58a3}. Since all the IDs from the 10, 000
replayed messaged are different from ID1 0x0001, these
replayed messages will be discarded by ECU2.
Lemma 3. LEAP is secure against the masquerade attack.
Proof. LEAP provides authentication for each message by
encrypting and inserting the sender’s ID into the Data Field.
Without knowing the session key, the masquerade attack will
be thwarted because the ID out of the Data Field will be
different with the ID of the messages from the attacker.
ECUA uses ECU1’s ID1 0x0001 to broadcast messages
without knowing the session keys and ECU2 receives mes-
sages from ECUA. The result is same as the replay attack
that ID decrypted out of the Data Field does not equal to
ECU1’s ID1. Thus, ECU2 will discard the messages from
ECUA.
Lemma 4. LEAP is secure against the flooding attack.
Proof. In the flooding attack, the attacker attempts to
exhaust the target ECU’s computational resource by sending
it huge amounts of messages. If the attacker uses its real
ID, the receiver can easily detect the abnormal frequency
and alert that the CAN bus is under the flooding attack. If
the attacker uses other ECUs’ IDs, the authentication will
fail and the counter of the receiver will not increase, which
means the receiver will not generate new key-stream for the
subsequent messages. Since the decryption with the current
key-stream merely involves several XOR operations, even if
the attacker occupies full bandwidth of CAN, the number of
messages that the attacker sends on the CAN bus is less than
that the receiver can decrypt per second.
Considering the worst case, ECUA occupies full band-
width of CAN (500 Kbps) to launch the flooding attack to
ECU2. ECU2 has to decrypt all the received messages. The
results show that ECU2 is able to decrypt and authenticate
more than 12, 000 CAN messages per second while ECUA
can send at most 4, 400 CAN messages per second on the
CAN bus. Thus, ECU2 can operate normally under the
flooding attack
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
LEAP consists of two processes, the key update and distri-
bution process and the encryption and authentication process
for the CAN messages. We set the CAN bus prototype
at 500 Kbps as the high-speed in-vehicle CAN bus. We
first measure the cost of the Secure ECU (ECU3) and the
general ECUs (ECU1 and ECU2) in the key update and
distribution process. Then we compare LEAP with the state-
of-the-art MAC-based approaches in the message encryption
and authentication process.
A. Cost of Key Update and Distribution Process
As shown in Fig. 5, a general ECU performs one decryp-
tion of AES-128 to get SKnij and two keyed hash functions
for the authentication. The payload of the key-update request
is 128 + 32 = 160 bits so that three CAN messages are re-
quired. The interval between two consecutive CAN messages
is about 50 ms. The processing time is the time consumption
of the ECUs to operate the cryptographic primitives. The
total time consumption includes the processing time of the
Secure ECU and the pair of communicating ECUs, the
message intervals, and the transmission delay. We perform
the key update and distribution process for 10, 000 times on
the CAN bus prototype, the average results are shown in
Table III. The results shown that the resource of a general
ECU is enough for the key update and distribution process.
Considering the large amounts of ECUs, the key update
and distribution process will inevitably incur overhead. In
order to reduce the impact on the performance of the CAN
communications, instead of updating and distributing the
keys for all the ECUs at one time, the Secure ECU would
control this process for each pair of communicating ECUs
at regular intervals according to the order of IDs.
TABLE III
COST OF KEY UPDATE AND DISTRIBUTION PROCESS
Memory / byte Processing
time / ms
Total
time / ms
Code memory RAM
Secure
ECU 7, 880 640 70.2
199.4
General
ECU 5, 660 419 15.9
Fig. 9. Comparison between LEAP and AMEAP in terms of memory
consumption, time consumption for each CAN message, and extra payload
for authentication.
B. Comparison with Existing Approaches
We take [13] as a comparison to demonstrate that LEAP
is able to provide confidentiality and authentication for the
CAN messages with higher efficiency and lower cost. The
security protocol of [13] is denoted as AMEAP because it
is based on AES-128 and 32-bit MAC. We control ECU1
to broadcast 10, 000 CAN messages to ECU2 to measure
the storage overhead of the two protocols and the average
time consumption of the sender and receiver to process a
CAN message. As shown in Fig. 9, LEAP consumes less
code memory and RAM than AMEAP. It takes 1.998 ms
to process one CAN message for LEAP, which is about one
eighth of the time consumption of AMEAP. AMEAP needs
32 bits extra payload to insert MAC for the authentication
while LEAP only needs 11 bits. The results show that LEAP
has higher efficiency and lower cost than AMEAP.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we address the issue of protecting the
resource-limited in-vehicle networks. The lack of security
services in CAN makes it possible for the attackers to track
or even control a vehicle remotely, which threats the safety
of drivers and passengers. According to the analysis of the
existing attack cases, there are four basic attack models
based on the attacker’s ability and motivation. Taking into
consideration the performance and the compatibility of the
CAN bus, we propose LEAP to thwart these attacks with
less cost and high efficiency. A set of experiments has been
conducted on a CAN prototype that contains three ECUs
to evaluate the security and performance. Compared with
the MAC-based approaches, LEAP can efficiently guarantee
the confidentiality and authentication for each CAN message
with much less storage overhead and time consumption.
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